Over the past three decades, much discussion and many articles have been written regarding the difficult, value-laden decisions that health professionals, patients (and/or their families), and society face as technology advances efforts to cure or palliate diseased newborns or to support very immature infants. Efforts in the newborn intensive care unit have not met with unanimous applause, as some infants have succumbed after protracted, painful, and expensive stays, as some parents have become alienated after being disenfranchised from the decisions affecting their infants, and as some families have had to experience and endure the extensive suffering of their infants and caregivers long after leaving the newborn intensive care unit.
Ethical debate over newborn care in the era of newborn intensive care began with concern that some infants were being denied beneficial intervention inappropriately, as described in the case of the infant with Down's syndrome allowed to die without attempting intestinal surgery in the early 1970s. When in the mid-1970s, Duff and Campbell revealed that many infants with serious illnesses and poor prognoses were allowed to die, many outraged voices drowned out the words of those who raised questions about the role of prognosis and family involvement in trying to decide what was right. Many professionals paternalistically decided to initiate or continue care without considering the alternative of non-intervention. In reaction, for some other cases, as in the cases of Bloomington Baby Doe, Baby Jane Doe, or of the Illinois conjoined twins, courts were sought to find wisdom when professionals and parents could not agree. The government attempted to create guidelines to protect the vulnerable and the handicapped, but left the decision to be determined ultimately by what was``virtually'' futile in the``r easonable'' judgment of physicians. Individuals and institutions wrestled with the problem of the marginally viable newborn by trying (vainly, in my opinion) to create weight-based or gestational age± based rules for delivery room resuscitation. One father took drastic measures by holding caregivers at gunpoint as he removed his seriously injured child from the ventilator in Illinois (he was not punished) and another was accused of murder when he and his wife removed their son from assisted ventilation after they refused further intensive efforts and then were left alone with their child by the staff of the newborn unit. (The father was acquitted.) All of the above occurred as efforts were ongoing to define the process of ethical decision making. I submit that these efforts, well-intentioned as they were, failed to answer the call.
Good ethics requires good medicine. Good medicine requires current, evidence-based data from studies applicable to the patient's condition. When data apply to survival, to the potential for adverse consequences, or to the impact on the family, the data are not interpreted similarly by all families. For the physician or health professional to help families in these situations, accurate data are essential. Good data are necessary, but not sufficient to assure good decision making. Knowledge of the range of ethically supportable and acceptable options must be understood and shared with the family decision maker(s) and the professional must be prepared to support the choice of the family. For decisions in the gray zone, families' choices may not be that which we think we would choose for our own child (most professionals have not had to make the hard choices we see families of our patients confront). This process of shared decision making can be discussed in the classroom setting, but understanding comes with living through the experience at the bedside. Educators must be effective role models for ethics as well as for therapeutics. 
